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How to Govern Darfur? 
 
James Morton 
 
Sir William Luce Memorial Fellow 2011 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1934, William Luce went on his first ever trek as Assistant District Commissioner, 
Nyala.  A young man, he was looking for good horses, and he was keen to shoot his 
first lion.  But there was business to attend to as well.  South-east of Idd al Ghanam, 
he spent two days in lengthy talks with a group of „discontented Gimr chiefs‟.  The 
chiefs were complaining about their omda - the next rank up in the hierarchy through 
which the colonial government ruled Darfur under the system known as Native 
Administration – and they had sworn that they would no longer serve under him.  The 
meeting followed a common pattern.
1
  The chiefs‟ complaints were heard, not very 
sympathetically.  Some of the omda‟s worst misdemeanours were corrected, and the 
chiefs were allowed to name a „chief of chiefs‟, to represent them separately at the 
Tribal Court.  At the same time, they were threatened with prison if they continued to 
refuse the omda‟s leadership.  To reinforce the message, the meeting was followed by 
a demonstration of machine-gun firepower against a mock „Dervish Village‟.  The 
dummy dervishes were riddled with bullets, their water pots exploded noisily and 
their tukls, or grass huts, went up in flames. „Wallahi, hukuma shadida‟, was the 
public verdict: „By God, the Government is strong.‟ 2  
 
This episode summed up the colonial answer to the question „how to govern Darfur?‟: 
with a combination of listening and compromise, backed up with a crude but credible 
threat of overwhelming force.  The aim of this paper is to look at how the question has 
been answered at different times during Darfur's history, in the hope that this may 
lead to some ideas about how it might be answered in the present day. My starting 
point is that the current situation in Darfur is not solely, or even largely, the result of 
exploitation, injustice and political struggle.  Instead, the most important factor has 
been the Sudanese state‟s failure to find an effective form of regional government.  
My end point is more worrying: that neither the Government of Sudan nor the 
international community have a clear idea of what their answer to the question of my 
title might be, or how it might be implemented.  
 
For over 50 years scholars have depended on Durham University‟s Sudan Archive of 
material from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.  Its founder, Richard Hill, can never 
have expected that the history it records would become a topic of immense political 
importance in the early 21
st
 century.  Whether it is between North and South Sudan or 
in Darfur, archaic disputes are being revived; and relatively minor colonial decisions 
are being forged into new weapons for modern struggles.  Inevitably, historical truth 
has been one of the casualties of Sudan‟s wars.  Sean O‟Fahey, the founder of Darfur 
historical studies, has pointed out how his work on the Fur sultanate land grant called 
hakura is now being misinterpreted.  Different groups are now using the term hakura 
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to mean an unalienable tribal homeland.  This is „fantasy history‟, in O‟Fahey‟s 
words, being treated as political fact.
3
  
 
Interpretations of history also influence the way the international community sees 
Darfur.  Some blame the colonial state for re-creating ethnic divisions which were on 
the way to disappearing.  Others accuse the Condominium of giving power to a 
metropolitan elite which has taken control of a „neo-patrimonial state‟ and pushed 
Darfur to the margin. The fact that both point the finger at the Condominium only 
underlines how important the Durham Sudan Archive is to a balanced view.  I am 
particularly grateful, therefore, to the Sir William Luce Memorial Fund for the 
opportunity to use this unique resource and, in particular, to Jane Hogan and her 
colleagues for their patience and generosity in helping me to find my way round it.  
 
To answer my self-imposed question, I shall try to do three things.  First, I want to 
review current interpretations of the situation in Darfur.  After that, as the main part of 
the paper, I present a historical synthesis of Darfur institutions across three eras. The 
Fur Sultanate came into being in the 17
th
 century and ruled Darfur until the end of the 
19
th
 century; after a short period of Egyptian and Mahdist rule, it was revived in 1898.  
The next era started in 1916, when the British invaded Darfur and overthrew Ali 
Dinar, the last Fur Sultan.  Just 40 years later, in 1956, Darfur became part of the 
independent Republic of Sudan.  At the end of the paper, I shall try to describe what a 
coherent effort to build long-term solutions for Darfur might look like, and look at 
how far current international policies are likely to help or hinder such an effort. 
  
Interpretations of Darfur  
 
It would be easy to spend all of my lecture trying to interpret the real and imagined 
causes of conflict in Darfur.  However, one of my purposes is to argue that 
identifying, and designing remedies for, causes is not the best way to improve things.  
So I am going to keep this as short as possible. 
 
Almost all Darfuris are Sunni Muslims.  Unlike many conflicts, religion and sect have 
no relevance.  Ethnicity, on the other hand, is fundamental.  It is difficult, however, to 
decide whether it is ethnicity at the level of race, or at the lower level of the tribe.  
Darfuris certainly talk about race, as a division between Arabs and non-Arabs.  The 
latter are known locally as Zurqa‟, or Blues.4 However, many Zurqa‟ tribes only 
speak Arabic, and several claim a measure of Arab descent.  Conflict is just as 
frequent between Arab tribes as it is between Arab and non-Arab, and it is not 
uncommon between two Zurqa‟ tribes.   
 
The Save Darfur Coalition has been described as the most effective mass movement 
in America since the end of the Vietnam War.  In 2004, continuous pressure from the 
Coalition led the USA to declare that Government of Sudan‟s actions constituted 
genocide by an Arab government against the non-Arab peoples of Darfur. Seven years 
later, the Coalition website presents a less black and white picture.  Nevertheless, it 
continues to talk about genocide in Darfur and describes the Government of Sudan as  
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the most responsible for the violence in Darfur. President al-Bashir and others 
in his government created the anarchic conditions presiding in Darfur today 
through their violent counterinsurgency campaign targeting innocent men, 
women and children.
5
 
 
Anarchy is hardly genocide, but no one in the West seems to be willing to lose face by 
withdrawing the „G word‟. And as even the Save Darfur Coalition recognises, the 
Khartoum government cannot be blamed for everything.  What can be called the first 
Darfur civil war started in 1987.  That was when Darfuris themselves first began to 
talk of a struggle between Arab and Zurqa‟.6  It was two years before the National 
Islamic Front coup which brought the current regime into power in Khartoum.  In 
other words, Darfur „began as a civil war to which Government was not a party‟.7  
 
Another powerful voice, that of Mahmoud Mamdani, has shifted the blame from 
Government of Sudan to the British.  He argues that the Darfur Sultanate developed 
new forms of land tenure and administration.  These, together with Islam, allowed it 
to start to „create a kind of detribalization.‟  However, after the British invaded in 
1916, the colonial state „reverse[d] these developments with all the resources it could 
muster.‟8  How far this is justified by the evidence will, I hope, emerge in my next 
section. 
 
Whether it was the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium or the independent Sudanese state, 
the lion‟s share of investment in health, education, agriculture or infrastructure has 
gone to the riverain core of Sudan: the areas around Khartoum and along the Nile.
9
  
This neglect has become a standard part of the case against the Khartoum 
Government.  It was the central accusation in an anonymous critique of the National 
Islamic Front regime, which allegedly appeared overnight on President Bashir‟s desk 
in 2000.   The authors of this famous Kitab al Aswad - The Black Book - were later 
linked to a leading Darfur rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement.  
Development marginalisation is often linked to exploitation by the jallaba, the class 
of merchants - many from the same riverain elite as the Khartoum government - who 
dominate trade throughout Sudan: „extracting profits from the peripheries and 
investing them in the center‟.10  
 
Some say Darfur has been marginalised politically.  It might have been better if it had 
been, because Sudanese politics have helped to turn local difficulties into something 
more serious.  As the largest tribe, democratic politics gave the non-Arab Fur an 
opportunity to win back the dominance they lost when the British abolished the Fur 
Sultanate in 1916.  In 1981 demonstrations in Khartoum forced President Numeiri to 
replace his nominee for Governor of Darfur with Ahmed Direij, a senior Fur 
politician.  After a brief period of multi-ethnic regional government, Arab politicians 
sought to resist what they saw as Fur domination by calling on the support of the 
Umma party, one of two parties which dominated national politics.  As the Mahdi‟s 
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ansar, the Arab tribes of Darfur held a special position in the Umma.  When civil war 
broke out in 1987, the result was that the Arab side would not trust the regional 
government, led by a Fur, and the non-Arab side would not trust the national 
government led by the Umma.
11
    
 
The National Islamic Front coup of 1989 seemed to offer a way out of this stalemate.  
Hasan al Turabi, the NIF‟s leading thinker, presented the movement as colour-blind. 
The democratic government‟s failure to resolve the situation in Darfur was part of the 
Front‟s justification for the coup. However, in 1999 the National Islamic Front split.  
In the process it revealed that its multi-ethnic claims were only skin deep.  When Al 
Turabi left the ruling party many leading Darfuris left with him. Some of them went 
on to found the rebel Justice and Equality Movement, taking their struggle for central 
power to a new battlefield in Darfur.
12
 
 
Almost everyone sees competition for water, grazing and farm land as a key cause of 
conflict; competition which has been made steadily worse by drought, environmental 
degradation and increasing population pressure.  But this may oversimplify a complex 
issue.  It has been shown that rainfall was not abnormally low in the years leading up 
to the current conflict.
13
  And disputes over natural resources are nothing new.  On the 
contrary, for Darfuris it is business as usual.  The puzzle is to understand why that 
business has become so much more destructive.  One reason is politics.  A Sudanese 
commentator writing in the 1980s pointed out that „other reasons are always 
rationalised in terms of this kind of competition [over pasture and water].  On many 
occasions disputes have started as political or local political issues which the 
interested parties have blown up into a tribal conflict.‟14   
 
A final factor to be considered is administration.  How odd that sounds.  How can 
something as banal as administration be a major factor in a civil war described 
variously as genocide and the worst humanitarian disaster since Rwanda?  
Nevertheless, this dull sounding topic is the focus of the rest of the paper.  Because 
this is where I hope to find some answers to the question in my title: How to govern 
Darfur?  I also hope to demonstrate that this is a much more important question than 
the ones which are most often asked, such as „who is to blame‟, and „who is 
oppressed‟ and „who is the oppressor‟?  
 
Institutions of Civil Administration in Darfur  
 
In 1992, in the aftermath of what I have called the first Darfur civil war, I wrote a 
paper called „Tribal Administration or No Administration: The Choice in Western 
Sudan‟.  It raised little interest and I could not get it published in a major journal.  
How times have changed.  From Mamdani to de Waal, no discussion of Darfur is 
complete without a substantial section on the colonial institution variously known as 
Indirect Rule, Native Administration or Tribal Administration.  All these phrases are 
loaded with the attitudes and theories of the British colonial service.  I prefer the 
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standard Arabic title which comes without this baggage: al idarat al ahlia: translated 
as civil administration, just as civil war is harb ahlia.   
 
The idarat al ahlia is a system of local government in which the state uses traditional 
leaders – chiefs or shaykhs - to administer the people of their tribe; where tribe means 
any group which is organised around kinship.  This was the system the colonial power 
used to govern rural Sudan.  Almost from the start, British officials debated whether 
they were right to do this, and that debate continues in the academic literature to this 
day.  But it is a question of much more than academic interest, because the idarat al 
ahlia still provides the basic framework of administration in Darfur.  As a local 
government institution it has proved stronger than any alternative, and most Darfuris 
accept it, at least in principle.  This was recognised by its inclusion in the Darfur 
Peace Agreement signed in Abuja in 2006.  
 
The idarat al ahlia evolved under the Fur sultanate, and subsequent British 
developments were extraordinarily ad hoc.  The result is a patchwork of different 
arrangements and titles, based on a common set of principles.  For brevity I am only 
going to refer to one of many different hierarchies which existed.  This has a nazir as 
the paramount chief of each tribe, supported by a number of omdas, with a group of 
shaykhs subordinate to each one.  At William Luce‟s meeting with the Gimr shaykhs, 
which I described in my introduction, he was accompanied by the nazir of the Bani 
Halba tribe, to which the Gimr were subordinate, and the discussion concerned their 
omda.  The phrase idarat al ahlia only came into use in the colonial period but I am 
going to use it to refer to the institutions of civil administration in all periods, from the 
early Fur Sultanate onwards.  
 
In Darfur, the individual‟s social identity is defined by a combination of „kinship and 
territoriality‟;15 a combination which is embodied in the person‟s tribe or clan.  Under 
the idarat al ahlia the individual is taxed and punished through the tribe.  
 
This society is built in two layers.  The bottom layer is formed by the relationship 
between the individual and the tribe.  Above that comes the relationship between the 
tribal leadership and the state.  We know far more about what was happening in the 
top layer: the doings of the Sultan and his court, and the thoughts of the British 
colonial officers.  How the ordinary Darfuri lived is much less clear, not to speak of 
what he thought.  The result is a literature which focusses on the relationship between 
ruler and tribal leadership, with a tendency to see colonial policies as an attempt „to 
create a common ground between individual [British] officials and chiefs, from which 
to look down upon their undifferentiated “tribal subjects”.‟16  Similarly, histories of 
the Fur Sultanate describe its institutions as a system to extract resources for the State 
and its immediate adherents.  The communities‟ main contact with their rulers was 
confined to war, justice in matters such as homicide that could not be settled within 
the community, and taxation.  The state expected little of its people and the people 
expected little of the state.
17
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The Individual and the Tribe 
 
To understand how a tribe works, we must turn to anthropology.  Ian Cunnison‟s 
Baggara Arabs describes the Messiriya Humr, a cattle-owning tribe of southern 
Kordofan in the 1950s, just at the point of Sudanese independence.
18
  Ladislav Holy‟s 
Neighbours and Kinsmen describes the Berti, a non-Arab farming tribe of north 
eastern Darfur, in the 1960s, before major changes were made to the idarat al ahlia in 
1971.
19
   
 
An hereditary tribal leadership seems fundamentally undemocratic.  Many argue that 
the support of the British reinforced that unequal relationship between the tribal elite 
and the ordinary person.  But while tribes may not have elections, shaykhs and other 
leaders have to earn their authority and legitimacy, in the face of constant challenge 
from competitors.  Tribes are sophisticated institutions for the management of what in 
a modern state would be called public goods, social insurance, resource management 
and justice.  Even quasi-banking and insurance functions can be identified.  
 
How can democracy be expressed without votes?  The answer is by „voting with their 
feet‟.  If a group of Darfuri tribesmen are unhappy with their leader, they abandon 
him for someone who is more popular or more effective.  Politics takes the form of 
competition for followers, not votes.  This is most evident for the shaykh responsible 
for tax collection.  The Berti shaykh had to deliver the required tax to the omda, but 
his ability to do so depended on his followers, who wanted to pay as little tax as 
possible.  Apart from losing followers, a shaykh who cannot deliver faces an ultimate 
sanction, his followers‟ refusal to pay tax.  This forces his dismissal by the omda.  
The link between taxation and tribal leadership has a long history.  In Wada‟i in early 
1874, Nachtigal met a „section of the Mahamid who, tired of the extortions of their 
Shaykh Hagar, had left their home.‟   
 
Although the principle of hereditary leadership is accepted, it is always subject to 
negotiation.  Among the Berti, a shaykh will try to secure the succession for one of his 
sons, through consultation with the elders in the community.  However, if no son is 
considered suitable, „the threat that the followers can ultimately transfer their 
allegiance to a different sheikh usually makes him agree to pass over his sons and 
choose some other near kinsman.‟  
 
A tribal leader has several duties to perform.  Among the Humr, the pressure is even 
greater.  „While the official duty of the sheikh is to collect tax, in the eyes of the Humr 
he has the worthier obligation of lending out the tax money he has collected.‟  The 
result is that a shaykh‟s followers can risk his whole position.  „[A shaykh] must be 
rich to start with as a reasonable assurance against the failure of the trading activities 
of his followers and himself.‟  This shaykh is effectively acting as his people‟s bank-
cum-insurance fund.  As the public face of the community, he must be a generous 
host; for a popular Humr omda, „hardly a night passed without the obligation to feed 
and accommodate guests‟. He must help his followers in need.  Among the Baggara 
this means lending them cattle to start a herd.  And he must represent his followers to 
outsiders and to the state.   
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In settled communities, the leadership has a number of other responsibilities.  Among 
the Berti in the 1960s, an aqid al birr maintained the village well, ritually as well as 
physically.  The well was used on a rota by different household groups controlled by a 
ra‟is al dima, or rota manager.  Fees were charged for these different services.  
Outsiders were allowed to use the well, causing quarrels and skirmishes, especially 
over watering livestock.  These were dealt with first by the ra‟is al dima, who could 
fine offenders.  If this failed, appeals might go to the aqid al birr, to the omda and 
ultimately to the tribal court.  Fights at wells are now an important cause of current 
conflicts in Darfur, reflecting the breakdown of these control systems.  But there is 
not much new in Darfur.  In 1881, Slatin witnessed Meidob women refuse to let the 
Shaigia water their horses until they had filled their own jars.  To which the Shaigia 
replied „“This is the result of bringing liberty into the country.  By Allah, ... were not 
Slatin with us, you and your vessels would very soon be our property.” “God grant 
him a long life!” was the retort.‟20  
 
Livestock raiding has always been endemic in Darfur, and dealing with it is another 
important job for the leadership.  Browne, the first European visitor to Darfur, 
describes Malha as „infested by the Cubba-Beesh, a wandering tribe who, mounted on 
the swiftest dromedaries, rapidly traverse the desert and live by plundering the 
defenceless.‟21  That was in the 1790s;  nearly 200 years later Hales describes how 
Kababish raiding the Meidob in the 1970s won respect as well as wealth, and the non-
Arab Meidob had almost as bad - or good - a reputation for camel theft as the Arab 
Kababish.
22
  This was not a struggle between races, or between nomad and farmer.  It 
was two camel-herding tribes competing on a more or less equal footing.    
 
For both Berti and Humr public opinion is powerful.  Among the Baggara, this is 
most strongly voiced by the women.  They have no formal role in political life and 
there is a firm divide between the women‟s domestic space and the men‟s public one.  
The women bridge this gap through song so effectively that they are „the arbiters of 
men‟s conduct, and they can make or break a man‟s political career .... by singing 
songs of praise or alternatively of mockery.‟  
 
It is not just the leadership which gains power and wealth from having more 
followers.  The whole community benefits and there is strong social pressure to avoid 
splits.  Conversely, expulsion is the ultimate sanction for anti-social behaviour.   
 
I have kept the most important function of the tribal leadership to last; the 
management of conflict in the community.  Cunnison describes what happens after a 
killing among the Humr.  First the ajawid, or elders, seize the male kin of the victim 
and get the victim‟s camp to move away.  The police are called and they hold both the 
killer and the victim‟s kin.  A „guarantor (damin) of the peace‟ is named, someone 
who is influential in the victim‟s community but who also has recognised standing 
with others.  This sets the scene for negotiations. If things escalate, then the omdas 
and nazirs may be called in.  In the worst case one or other party may move away or 
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change tribe.  „But after a generation approaches are made to ask them to return, with 
the offer of a generous price for peace.‟23    
 
The price for peace takes the form of diya.  By the dictionary this means blood 
money.  Among the Berti, at least, it also refers to compensation for damage to 
property, killing a camel for example.    Who pays, and how much, is a key indicator 
of the social structure.  Under Islamic law, diya is regarded as compensation paid to 
the victim‟s family by the killer‟s paternal relatives.  It is recognised that this is a 
form of insurance.  Western Sudanese custom spreads the insurance over the wider 
community, not just the paternal relatives.  The insurance element is even clearer in 
the way contributions to the diya are collected, and the way it is distributed among the 
victim‟s community.  Close relatives of the killer pay one third of the diya, but close 
relatives of the victim receive two thirds.  The remaining two thirds of the payment 
come from the wider community, who get the smaller share of the payment as, in 
effect, the premium for the insurance provided.  The Berti have a formal position, the 
ra‟is al diya, who has the job of organising the collection of the diya from his lineage.  
Their scale of payments for different injuries is strongly reminiscent of wording in a 
standard British insurance contract; but instead of £1,000 for a finger it is three cows, 
and two cows for a canine tooth. 
 
Decisions to participate in blood money payments may be influenced by tactical 
hostilities and alliances within the community.
24
  Among the Humr, a small group 
may look to reinforce its relatively weak kinship support, asala, by agreeing a book 
alliance sworn on the Quran with groups outside their immediate kin. Cunnison 
suggests that these book alliances can be the first step towards the establishment of a 
fictional but politically real kinship, „by virtue of the common ancestry which comes 
to be assumed.‟25   Blood money is not paid for a killing inside the immediate lineage, 
although a sadaqa payment may be made, not as compensation, but as an offering for 
the dead.  As the relationship between the killer and his victim becomes more distant, 
so blood money arrangements become more formal and more complex.  In most cases 
an omodiyya is based on one kinship group, and diya arrangements within it are 
flexible.  Even between omodiyyas, matters may be arranged locally and not all the 
members necessarily contribute to the diya.  
 
Cunnison suggests that in the past diya arrangements did not exist between the major 
tribes.  Vengeance was the only remedy for homicide by someone from another tribe.  
The inter-tribal diyat al saff was only introduced under the Condominium, and 
recorded in formal agreements lodged with the provincial government.  At this level, 
all members of the tribe are expected to contribute to the diya.  
 
The distinction between murder and manslaughter, unintentional homicide, is 
important.  Diya is only acceptable in cases of manslaughter; although a killing during 
an affray is recognised as accidental.  Sharia allows a victim‟s family to refuse diya 
and insist on qisas, vengeance, in the case of premeditated murder proven in front of a 
qadi.  If the family will accept blood money, then the killer is responsible for the 
whole amount and his relatives are under no obligation to pay.  Customary law is less 
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clear and killers might seek refuge with their shaykh or omda to avoid immediate 
vengeance.  In modern times, this meant that they went to court and risked a prison 
sentence, but the Condominium courts allowed scope for a reduction in sentence if 
diya was paid.     
 
Haramys „Eating‟ the Nas 
 
Language is revealing, but extremely difficult to interpret correctly.  Perhaps for this 
reason, the British were fond of including Arabic words in their reports.  MacMichael, 
one of the founders of the British version of the idarat al ahlia, is quoted saying: „I 
have seen a few cases here of gross misuse of the old hukms which would never have 
been tolerated if the nas had understood what was happening‟. Here hukm can be 
translated as judicial powers, while Willis describes the nas as „those without 
authority of any sort – the „subjects‟.‟26  This picture of an oppressive tribal elite 
exploiting their innocent subjects is incompatible with the politically competitive 
society I have just described, a society in which the nas know very well how to 
control their rulers.  It is not impossible that it was not the „unknowing subjects‟ who 
did not understand what was happening, but rather the British administrators trying to 
apply their alien concepts of right and wrong.  
 
The colonial record is deeply ambivalent about the tribal leadership on which the 
idarat al ahlia depended.  Practical politics meant that British officials had little 
choice, in the early years at least, but to „back up the local men unless and until it was 
demonstrated beyond doubt that they were either disloyal or unjust when judged by 
native standards.‟27   But it is clear that they had difficulty interpreting what „native 
standards‟ actually were.  Tribal politicians became adept at exploiting their 
uncertainty.   Another key word is zulm, or oppression.  Communities which wished 
to overthrow their leader might claim he was an oppressor, zalim, and they were 
oppressed, mazlumin.  The British were sensitive to these accusations, but never quite 
sure what constituted oppression.   One can read the same uncertainty in a charter of 
the Fur Sultan Muhammad al Fadl, one of whose charters from 1806 ends a list of 
officials with the phrase „all the oppressors who trample the rights of Muslims‟, in 
seeming recognition that officials are by definition going to be oppressive.
28
  
 
„Eating‟ is another loaded word.  For some reason British officials always translated 
this one into English.  On face value it means the embezzlement of tax and court 
revenues.  Vaughan describes three generations of one Baggara nazirate, which make 
a neat case study in „eating‟, zulm and tribal politics.  In 1920, Mahmud Abu Saad, 
who had been nazir of the Habbaniya under the Mahdia, was reappointed.  He had 
spent a long time as a Mahdist official in Omdurman.  On his return he failed to re-
adjust to what was required of a nazir in Darfur.  He was seen as too much the 
government‟s man and, more importantly, as being stingy.  As the Assistant District 
Commissioner reported, he did not entertain the tribal elite with „lashings of tea and 
sugar‟; and he failed in his obligation to redistribute wealth among his supporters.  
The result was that „tribal “discipline” declined steeply, as sheikhs refused to produce 
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tax, men for labour, or suspects for trial.‟  His successor, El Ghaali Taj al Din, could 
not have been more different.  The British reported him to be „a most outrageous 
zalim‟.  Yet he kept his post for 15 years, because he met the people‟s expectations 
and gained unchallenged prestige in the tribe.  As time went by, colonial standards 
became tighter.  In 1942, El Ghaali was taken to court for „eating‟, and convicted by 
his peers and judges, the neighbouring nazirs.  Not coincidentally, the Habbaniya 
were unpopular with their neighbours.  El Ghaali protested, probably correctly, that 
„he could not live on his pay and that all nazirs eat their dar.‟  He had to resign and his 
educated son Ali took over, but only three years later the Habbaniya omdas were 
dismissed for refusing to sit on the tribal court with him.  The neighbouring nazirs 
revealed their hypocrisy by supporting the omdas, on the grounds that Ali had 
prevented them from „eating‟, „while not distributing the proceeds of his own „eating‟ 
to them.‟29  Ali was caught between two sets of incompatible expectations: for 
rectitude on the part of government and for liberality and a blind eye to „eating‟ from 
his tribe.  
 
To the Baggara at least, it seems that it is not „eating‟ which is bad.  It only becomes 
zulm, or oppression, when it is unfair; above all, when the „eater‟ does not share the 
results with his constituency.  Nevertheless, accusations of „eating‟ and zulm were 
extremely useful weapons in tribal politics.  One last Arabic word from Cunnison‟s 
description of the Kordofan Humr adds another dimension to these ambiguous 
attitudes.  Haram is the Islamic work for sin.  And a harami is an evil doer, by the 
dictionary a thief or a bandit.  For the Humr, it meant something much more subtle 
and positive, summing up their respect for wealth and power.  „The nazirs are haramy, 
the Government is too; but they have the power and they deserve to be.‟  And just like 
the Habbaniya, the Humr saw „eating‟ as perfectly ethical: „by hiding their cattle 
Humr “eat” the Government in withholding tax; if the Government discovers the 
cattle and imposes fines, then it is the Government which is „eating‟ the Humr.  The 
game is one in which the Government is every bit as haramy as the Humr, and just as 
manly.‟30   
 
Ambiguity about „eating‟ was not confined to the Baggara under the British.  A Fur 
lord of Diima in the early 19
th
 century was called Isa Kul Barid.  His nickname Kul 
Barid is variously interpreted as „all cool‟, meaning patient and benevolent, or as 
„akal barid‟, because he „ate his people and was “cold” or haughty towards them.‟31  
„Barid‟ is just as ambiguous as „akal‟, so a third alternative is perfectly possible:  that 
he „ate coolly‟ or „lightly‟, meaning his demands were more reasonable than most.  
The depth of confusion over „eating‟ only really becomes clear when one finds that 
under the Fur Sultanate „eat‟ was a standard word for the legitimate use of state 
revenues.  A charter of Muhammad al Husayn (1838-73) confirms the assignment of a 
piece of land to the faqih Abdallah and that „he should eat the fitr, zakah, hamil and 
the customary taxes.‟32  
 
Some British political officers did their best to understand what was going on around 
them.  But they were overburdened and thin on the ground.  Among the nazirs and 
omdas and possibly even among the nas, there was a conspiracy to keep them in the 
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dark, and their greatest misunderstanding may have been over the scale of the 
responsibilities the tribal leadership carried, and what it cost them to maintain their 
leadership position, in the face of a nas which was more than capable of letting them 
know what it wanted.  This is not to suggest that extortion, bribery and other forms of 
zulm were not widespread; rather that it was extremely difficult to identify it where a 
leader had, or appeared to have, the support of his tribe.  
 
Customary Justice 
 
Critics argue that the British adopted the idarat al ahlia as a way to keep Egyptians 
and educated Sudanese out of the administration, following political difficulties with 
those groups in the early 1920s.  The first Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance was 
gazetted in 1922.  In Darfur, at any rate, this was a clear case of policy catching up 
with reality.  When the Ordinance was passed there were already 135 shaykhs 
exercising judicial powers in northern Sudan.
33
  
 
Even before the British conquest of Darfur in 1916, MacMichael, the political officer 
responsible for planning it, was recommending that „it would undoubtedly be 
necessary for some years to come to decentralize all administration as far as possible 
and to avoid weakening the hands of the tribal chiefs.‟34  The Governor General‟s 
proclamation, dropped out of an aircraft over El Fasher to announce the deposition of 
Ali Dinar, assured the population that   
 
The Sudan Government will leave in power all established heads of tribes who 
render the obedience to government and are just and acceptable to the people.
35
 
 
Identifying who was „just and acceptable to the people‟ was to turn out to be a big 
challenge.  But the fact remains that the British inherited their first version of the 
idarat al ahlia straight from Ali Dinar.  As MacMichael was to write:  
 
The more I see and understand of the system on which this country is run do I 
pay a grudging respect to Ali Dinar. It is no small thing to have kept it in 
entire subjugation, paying its taxes, never revolting  .... and I fancy that the big 
men he has periodically put to death – and when you think of it there were not 
many – probably deserved it.36    
 
It was, of course, pure bonus that Ali Dinar‟s system appeared to fit, virtually 
unchanged, into the fashionable British theories of Indirect Rule announced four years 
later.    
 
I say „appeared to fit‟ for a reason.  There is an extensive literature on Indirect Rule, 
focussed on the extent to which it concealed a hypocritical British policy to exploit 
large areas at low cost; and on the way it has distorted the political development of the 
countries where it was applied.  That is not my interest today, but it is relevant to 
point out that Darfur did not actually fit the theory very well.  Lugard‟s Dual 
Mandate, the bible of Indirect Rule, describes two possibilities.  The first, preferable, 
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arrangement is for a colonial Resident to act as more or less arm‟s-length adviser to a 
state which already has its own advanced institutions and bureaucracy.  Examples 
included the Indian native states and the Islamic states like the Sokoto Caliphate in 
northern Nigeria.  The second arrangement is for regions where there are almost no 
institutions, even at the level of the tribe.  Here the Lugardian prescription was to start 
from the bottom, encouraging tribes to form and coalesce into larger, more 
manageable units.  This was broadly the policy adopted in southern Sudan.  In Darfur 
the British created a situation which was neither one thing nor the other.  Although 
shaky after the Mahdia, the Fur Sultanate was a workable example of an established 
state with advanced institutions and a bureaucracy.    Once the Fur Sultan was gone, 
however, the British were left with the institutions but no state in which to put them.  
They had some success propping up a mini-state in Dar Masalit and a severe failure 
trying to establish a mini-Fur Sultanate in Zalingei.  Once that experiment ended in 
1936, apart from the Masalit Sultanate they were left with a workable idarat al ahlia 
but no Indirect Rule.  The Governor and the District Commissioners were going to 
have to continue to manage the idarat al ahlia themselves.  
 
Tradition dates customary justice in the Fur Sultanate to the half-legendary Sultan 
Daali of the late 15
th
 or 16
th
 century, and his kitab Daali: the Book of Daali.  Shari‟a 
law came later but it did not replace customary law so much as support it.   By the end 
of the 19
th
 century, a shartay (a Fur equivalent to a nazir) would judge by customary 
law, but with the advice of the Islamic fuqara.  There are almost no records of 
individual cases, but the basic structure can be understood from the list of crimes on 
which fines were payable: homicide, injury, adultery/fornication, straying cattle, fire 
raising, insult; and so on.  Fines were paid in cattle or in takiyya, lengths of cloth 
which were used as currency.  The payments were divided between the injured party, 
different levels of the idarat al ahlia and the Sultan.  O‟Fahey gives an example of a 
fine for adultery of thirty takiyya.  Half went to the Sultan‟s maqdum and half to the 
shartay and his dimlij.
37
   
 
The literature gives the impression that the Sultanate saw fines as just another source 
of revenue.  This misses two crucial points.  It was providing the vital service of 
justice in return for that revenue.  Second, and much more important, the fines 
represented the state‟s direct interest in the maintenance of public order.  Customary 
law and Shari‟a both treat murder, and other acts which would be criminal under 
western law, as civil disputes between two parties.  In contrast, the Fur Sultanate 
treated homicide and even relatively minor acts as criminal.  The fines represented a 
punishment levied by the state over and above any compensation made to the injured 
party.  In the late 18
th
 century, the Sultan would punish the community as a whole for 
a breach of the peace with a fine of „what proportion [he] thinks right of the property 
of the village  ... of the whole, of an half, of a third .. and this most rigorously 
estimated.‟  In a case of a battle between the Mahria and Mahamid camel tribes, the 
Sultan „seized one half of the camels of every Arab, and where they found five took 
three, as the fifth could not be divided.‟38  
 
The Condominium ordinances allocating judicial powers to the „Native Sheikhs‟ 
created something very similar to the Fur Sultanate‟s amalgam of customary law, 
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Shari‟a and criminal law.  The powers allocated were to run in parallel with both 
Shari‟a and the Sudan Penal Code.  The preamble to the 1922 Ordinance read as 
follows: 
 
Whereas it has from time immemorial been customary for nomad sheikhs to 
exercise powers of punishment upon their tribesmen and of deciding 
disputes among them, and whereas it is expedient that the exercise of these 
powers should be regularized.
39
  
 
Just as under the Fur Sultanate the 1922 Ordinance was based on fines, and the list of 
offences was very similar.  The Ordinance has just nine short paragraphs.  Rules for 
implementation were set by the Governor of each province, including the definition of 
major offences.  The shaykh could only judge minor offences on his own.  For the 
rest, he had to sit with a council of Tribal Elders.  
 
Subsequent Ordinances added the right to impose short prison sentences and 
floggings and gave more formal status to the Tribal Elders.  Any decision without the 
unanimous support of the elders went to the Governor or District Commissioner for 
approval.  Just 10 years later, the 1932 Native Courts Ordinance completed the shift 
from hukm by the shaykhs to hukm by a Court with a shaykh as President.
40
  The 1932 
Ordinance abandoned the formula „from time immemorial‟ and opened the possibility 
of Native Courts giving judgement on issues which were not covered by custom, 
including criminal offences under the Sudan Penal Code, though in 1934 a new 
Governor General put a halt to this, signalling that political officers should „ensure 
that native administration is run on parallel, but not identical lines with the State 
system of justice.‟41  
 
This was the correct decision.  Customary law, with its emphasis on conciliation and 
compensation, is not designed to handle premeditated murder and other criminal acts.  
Among the Berti, for example, diya is only paid for „accidental killing or damage.‟42 
This is why the 1927 Ordinance specifically excluded homicide, robbery, brigandage 
and offences against the state from the jurisdiction of shaykhs.  That it was right to do 
so is amply demonstrated by the current situation in Darfur, where the idarat al ahlia 
has proved unable to deal with what is, in large measure, brigandage combined with 
offences against the State. 
 
The result of the Governor General‟s decision was a reasonably clear structure in 
which the native courts judged cases under customary law up to the limit of their 
powers of punishment.  Above that limit, cases went to government courts, with the 
District Commissioner or a Judge as presiding magistrate, which applied the Sudan 
Penal Code. In common with many Islamic countries, shari‟a courts under a qadi 
dealt principally with family law.  
 
A final important point on justice under the idarat al ahlia.  In all the Ordinances 
right up to the 1932 Native Courts Ordinance the ultimate responsibility for 
enforcement lay with the Government, not the idarat al ahlia.  
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The District Commissioner may enforce the execution of any sentence or 
judgement of a Native Court on the request of the court or of the aggrieved 
party in the same manner as if it were a sentence or judgement of an ordinary 
court of law.
43
   
 
The Native Court had the full power of government behind it. 
 
Taxation and Administration 
 
The Powers of Sheikhs Ordinances were entirely judicial; no administrative powers or 
responsibilities are mentioned.  Yet taxation was always at least as important a part of 
the tribal leaders‟ job as justice.  Under the Condominium, they also became involved 
in administration relating to roads, wells, education, and public health. 
 
Before the colonial era, state revenues were founded on the Islamic taxes of zakat, 
ushr and fitr.  The first is a wealth tax, which in Darfur essentially meant livestock, at 
a rate of 1/40
th
.  The second, also commonly known as zakat, was a crop tax of 10% 
of the harvest.  The last was a poll tax paid at the Id al Fitr holiday after Ramadan.  
Babikr Bedri describes his work as a tax assessor during the Mahdia.  It was not an 
easy job; a sense of religious obligation should have encouraged tax compliance, but 
it did not.  With their hand on the Quran, leading citizens would cheerfully tell lies 
about their crops and the size of their family.
 44
  
 
Nachtigal describes the administrative hierarchy in Fur areas in the 1870s.  Village 
headmen were grouped under literate faqihs.  When the shartay ruling the district 
wanted to issue an instruction, it was through his subordinate dimlijs, who called the 
faqihs together to deliver it.
45
  For tax collection, „after swearing the shaykh and faqih 
on the Quran‟, presumably that their self-assessment was correct, the dimlij‟s men 
collected the tax for delivery to the shartay.
46
   No contemporary records say how big 
a share of the tax went to the faqih, dimlij and shartay.  Oral reports in the early 
Condominium said that the shartay kept as much as 50%.
47
   
 
Until the colonial period, cash was rare in Darfur and almost all taxes were paid in 
kind until the 1920s.  Most of the goods, especially grain, were bulky.  In good years 
revenues in kind were more than the Sultanate could actually use.  The system 
described was for the Fur heartland.  Other tribes close to the heartland paid on a 
similar basis.  Those on the periphery, like the Gimr and the Tama, paid tribute 
through their own sultans.  Nomads on the periphery were expected to pay tribute, but 
this sometimes had to be collected by force, through a  raid carried out by the Sultan‟s 
maqdum, or commissioner.  The Sultanate collected a range of other taxes, on markets 
for example, but the most important revenues came from traded items, slaves and 
ivory in particular, and from import and export levies.   
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After 1916, the British collected taxes in kind, through a system of assessment boards 
and junior officials, or mu‟awin.  This more bureaucratic approach may have been 
taken over from the Mahdist practice.  It had a number of problems.  The assessment 
boards were unpopular and as a Governor reported in 1922, „we never had sufficient 
DCs and ADCs to take charge of the usher boards and muawin do not always lend a 
sufficiently ready ear to complaints of over-assessments.‟  Corruption and over-
assessment by a mu‟awin was one cause of the Nyala uprising in 1921, the worst 
rebellion the British were ever to face in Darfur.
48
   The reduction of the shaykh‟s 
share from a third to just 5% seems certain to have added to the difficulty.  It was 
hardly surprising that the shaykhs were reported to be collecting „zeka for 
themselves.‟49  The British also faced the same problem as the Sultanate, that large 
quantities of grain, the main tax revenue, were not particularly useful.    
 
In 1924, to try to reduce some of these problems, the British replaced zakat and ushr 
with flat rate cash taxes, set at rates roughly equivalent to the current values of grain 
and cattle.  The assessment boards were abolished.  Although reported as a success, 
there were two potential difficulties: the fact that current values might become 
unreasonable if market prices changed, and the loss of Islamic legitimacy.  Shortages 
of cash in an economy which still lacked major markets were a more practical 
problem.  
 
Extending the tax coverage to tribes which had only paid tribute to the Sultans was 
another problem.  At one point the nazir of the Rizayqat, Ibrahim Musa Madibbu, 
threatened to resign, at least partly because he could not get his omdas to pay the new 
tax.
50
  In 1932, government gave up the struggle, transferring the cattle-herding tribes 
from poll and herd tax back to the tribute system.
51
 
 
To avoid public unrest, the Condominium always aimed to keep taxation light, and to 
maintain the principles of zakat, ushr and fitr, even if the method of assessment was 
changed and payment was required in cash.
52
  Direct tax consequently became a quite 
unimportant item in Government of Sudan revenues.  It fell from 49% in 1903 to 
below 20% in the 1920s and just 9.4% in 1938.  In absolute terms, the 1938 figure 
was only half that for 1921.  The slack was taken up by trade and consumption taxes, 
most especially that on sugar.
53
 
 
Under the Fur Sultanate, the tribal leaders of the idarat al ahlia took their pay entirely 
as a share of the revenues from taxes and judicial fines in their area.  Initially, the 
British allowed this to continue.  In the late 1920s, they began to move the more 
senior ranks onto fixed salaries, while leaving the omdas and shaykhs to share 10% of 
taxes collected.  The overall trend was to place revenues from fines and taxes in a 
Tribal Chest or treasury, transforming personal rule into a more bureaucratic 
structure; which steadily looked much more like a local government council.  It was at 
this point that the phrase Native Administration took on its full meaning.  The aim 
was to create a hierarchy of Native Administrations under four maqdum‟s courts at 
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Kutum, Nyala, Zalingei and Al Tuwayshah.  This was believed to mirror, 
approximately, the structure under the Fur Sultanate; it also reflected the politics and 
personalities of the time.  The Al Tuwayshah Maqdumate, for example, was to 
accommodate the most powerful Baqqara tribe, the Rizayqat, along with the Birqid 
who had little in common with them.
54
   
 
The structures were quite bureaucratic.  The maqdum had a chief qadi and a wazir, 
plus a number of salaried ajawid, or elders.  These were to represent the major tribes 
on the maqdum‟s court.  The court‟s main purpose was to hear appeals on decisions 
made by the nazirs and others who held courts under the Native Sheikhs Ordinance.    
As well as being president of the court, the maqdum was also chief executive of the 
Native Administration, complete with budget, accounts and a Native Treasury, and its 
prison and police.  Revenues from the traditional taxes revenues were to be split, 
50:50, between the Native Administration and the Government, and the 
Administration was responsible for roads, wells, markets and veterinary services.
55
  
 
It is clear that this is a description of what the British hoped to achieve, not the reality.  
The only successful maqdumate seems to have been Nyala, and even that left major 
tribes like the Bani Halba outside its remit.  In Kuttum, the treasury was reported to be 
successful, but the maqdum could not control the court.  In Zalingei, the emirate 
collapsed in corruption and oppression.
56
  It is not clear that the Al Tuwayshah court 
was ever established.  There were two principal reasons for these failures.  Few 
Darfuri leaders had the personality and integrity to fill the post of maqdum, especially 
the ability to win support across different tribes.  The ones who seemed to have this 
ability came from families which had been important under the Sultanate: Adam 
Rijal, in Nyala, the Dadinqawis in al-Fashir and the Dimanqawis in Zalingei.
57
  
Secondly, many parts of Darfur, especially those on the periphery, did not have the 
minimal cohesion needed to make the model work.  The maqdumate of the north 
failed on both points.  Although he came from the family which had held the job 
under the Sultans, Yusuf al Magdum Sharif did not succeed.  But his task was much 
the most difficult.  His area covered northern tribes, such as the Zaghawa and the 
Mahriyya, which were notoriously troublesome and had never been under effective 
control.   
 
Indirect Rule is often accused of creating overbearing tribal chiefs.  With their 
romantic ideas about noble Arab nomads, uncritical British officials allowed them to 
exploit their people.  Ali al Tom, nazir of the Kababish in Kordofan, is a well known 
example.
58
  But in Darfuri tribes there was a considerable degree of accountability and 
political competition to keep the tribal chiefs in check.  Nevertheless, their 
relationship with British officials did give the nazirs, at least, an extra card to play in 
the game of tribal politics.  There were those at higher levels in the Sudan political 
service who were aware that this needed to be watched.  One objective of the 
bureaucratic ideal just described was to get away from „direct rule‟ by colonial district 
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commissioners working too closely with the tribal leadership, replacing them with 
something more formal.
 59
  
 
Land, Territoriality and Mobility 
 
When it started, the current civil war in Darfur was seen as an insurgency by a 
marginalised people against the Government, and the exploitative elite which headed 
it.   Then it was identified as a race war between Arab supremacists and non-Arabs.  
The most recent interpretation is that it is a conflict over land, where land does not 
just mean farm land and grazing.  It also means the possession of a tribal homeland, in 
Arabic a dar.  In Mamdani‟s view the British „divided Darfuri society into two 
groups: tribes with dars and tribes without‟, and „the [dar-less] Arabs of Darfur were 
doubly marginalized‟; once as Darfuris and once more as a people without a territory 
to call their home.
60
  The evidence really does not support Mamdani‟s analysis, but a 
claim for a dar is now a central plank in the negotiating position of many Arab tribes.  
Historical or not, politically it is now a fact. 
 
 I will use three examples to try to illustrate the broad principles of land tenure in 
Darfur.  The first example is the land grant, or hakura, described in the box.  This sets 
out how a land grant from the Fur Sultan to people from the Zayyadiya tribe was 
integrated into the tax and justice arrangements of the original tribe in whose dar 
(„belad‟ in the box) the land fell.  This 
single, relatively small grant already 
includes three layers of rights to occupancy, 
bundled one inside another like a Russian 
doll: the people of dar Beira, presumably 
Fur; the Zayyadiya themselves; and the 
„other settlers from other tribes‟ inside the 
Zayyadiya hakura.  It is to be noted that this 
is an entirely political arrangement.  Neither 
the Zayyadiya nor the „settlers from other 
tribes‟ were paying rent; the agreement 
related to the division of tax and other fees 
payable on the land, and to responsibilities 
for justice.  In other words, access to farm 
land was open, subject to agreed terms for 
integration into the existing political and 
judicial structure.  
 
The Ma‟alia of eastern Darfur have been quoted as an example of a dar-less tribe 
fighting for its rights.  They were finally allocated a dar and a nazir to rule it in 
1995.
61
  The Ma‟alia have had a long and chequered history; in 1874, Nachtigal 
reports them as variously fighting for and against the Rizayqat, in their battles with 
the Sultanate, and as bandits on the road to Kordofan.
62
   Half a century later, the 
Sultan Ali Dinar was still complaining to the British about Ma‟alia robberies on the 
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road to Kordofan.  Throughout the British era, attempts to unite the Ma‟alia with the 
Rizayqat alternated with unsuccessful periods under their own nazir.  Their situation 
is made more complex by the fact that their territory was originally part of Dar Berti.  
The Ma‟alia have a firm claim to the land.  They developed what was a waterless area 
by turning the baobab trees into water storage cisterns.  Here again the point is that 
claims to territory are overlapping and essentially political.  Neither the Berti nor the 
Rizayqat were demanding the right to farm the Ma‟alia land.  The colonial record 
indicates that the Berti had largely lost their claim as overlords of this part of their dar 
some time earlier.  The nazir of the Rizayqat, on the other hand, was less than 
enthusiastic about being responsible for the Ma‟alia at all.  It was simply the best 
solution the British could find for the fact that the Ma‟alia themselves were unable to 
nominate a nazir of sufficient status and integrity to do the job effectively.  
 
Below the political level just described, Holy‟s description of land tenure among the 
Berti provides a clear example of a pattern that is probably common in most settled 
areas of Darfur. The term hakura has been much debated, ever since O‟Fahey 
highlighted its importance in written charters of the Fur Sultanate.  These documents 
are quite ambiguous, but some interpret them as assignations of private property; such 
that „valuable land was alienated from its earlier ethnic associations.‟63   The Berti do 
not see it that way.   For them, sid al hakura is „lord of the lineage territory‟, ie a 
direct descendant of the group which first settled the area, who holds the land as 
representative of that group.  In most cases a shaykh holds this position, maintaining 
the link between land and the political structure.  Land within the hakura is further 
sub-divided into a number of fawasa overseen by a sid al fas (lord of the axe, ie 
possessing the right to clear the land).  For the Berti in the 1960s, land was freely 
available.  Anyone could open up uncleared land, with the consent of sid al fas taken 
as given provided he was paid the ushr.  The only exception related to gum arabic 
trees.  In uncleared land, they belong to sid al hakura.  If gum trees appear on 
cultivated land, they belong to the farmer, and the ushr goes to sid al fas.  
 
Once collected from the producer, the ushr tax was divided between the different post 
holders and the Government.  A shaykh who was also sid al fas would deliver the tax 
to the omda, who took two thirds and left one third to the shaykh.  In the same way, 
the omda delivered two thirds to the Government and kept one. 
 
The Berti distinguish between a shaykh who is sid el fas, or „owns land‟, and a shaykh 
who only „owns people.‟  The latter is amari.  If, for example, there are two kinship 
lineages in a village, the amari is shaykh of those of the lineage which did not first 
settle the area.  Even if his following is much larger and more successful, the amari 
will still give a third of his ushr tax to sid al fas. This structure exactly parallels the 
hakura described at the beginning of this section, where the Beira hakim (amara) took 
two thirds and gave one third to the Zayyadiya „siad et tin‟  (tin means „soil‟). 
 
Neighbours and Kinsmen, Holy‟s title, aptly sums up how the institutions embodied 
in a dar manage social relations between kinship groups who are sharing an area as 
neighbours.  What appear to be rights to land are more accurately defined as rights to 
the government of the area, in the form of tax and justice.  And those rights also 
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embody the obligations of the people using the land to contribute to the common 
good, through taxes, and submit to the justice of the area.  One last example to make 
the point, Sultan Muhammad al Fadl granted the Korobat, jallaba traders, a hakura in 
Dar Konyar.  They were successful and their slaves started to cultivate extensively on 
land outside the hakura. „On these areas the Shartai of Dar Konyar took ”Futra” and 
“Zaka.” The slaves were [also] subscribers to “dia” collections by the Shartai of Dar 
Konyar. But the Korobat at Gelli could not be called on for this service.‟64   
 
Mobility has always been a critical part of life in Darfur.  Farmers need to move in 
response to drought or better rains, and also to capture new opportunities, as the 
Ma‟alia did by opening up the waterless goz sands of eastern Darfur.  Each year cattle 
and camel herders need to follow the rain through the seasons.  Much of customary 
law is designed to manage this mobility.  Colonial records describe the system under 
the last Fur Sultan, Ali Dinar: 
 
If the people belonging to one Shartai and one Dar wished to go with their 
flocks and graze in the Dar of another they had to ask permission of the latter 
and could only come with his approval.  If A‟s people came with B‟s 
approval into his Dar to graze and water their flocks, during the time they 
were in B‟s Dar B passed judgment upon them for misconduct but A came 
and collected taxes due from them to Ali Dinar. 
 
The people of one Shartai if desirous of joining the Dar of another Shartai 
merely asked the latter‟s and the former‟s permission for their transfer.  If the 
people of one Shartai went to the Dar of another and lived there and then 
refused to return to their own Dar; and their Shartai complained they were 
forcibly returned by Ali Dinar. Occasionally two Shartais would agree as to 
the disposal of their people.
65
  
 
Perhaps it is worth quoting, for those who may suggest that this is a British invention, 
a 1900 charter of Ali Dinar, the last Fur Sultan, appointing Muhammad Ali Salih as 
„general sheikh‟ of the „Iraygat.  The charter sets out the boundaries of the territory he 
is responsible for and instructs „al Dimaysat, al Minawiya, Awlad Qirru, al Nasriya 
and all the tribe of al „Iraygat‟ to obey him and to gather together in one area and „that 
no one should make departure without his permission and those who happened to 
come from other places must report themselves to him.‟66  This is as comprehensive a 
statement of a pre-colonial dar as could be.  It is particularly apt in that the „Iraygat 
are a northern Arab tribe which has been accused of playing a leading role in the 
janjawid, and which might therefore be expected to be among the marginalised dar-
less Arabs. 
 
The colonial government of Darfur spent a large part of its time dealing with 
boundary disputes.  Some argue that it created hard divisions between tribes which are 
part of the problem today.   It is certainly true that they did not get all their decisions 
right.  In one important case they recognised this and changed the decision.  The 
Condominium first set the boundary of Darfur 40 miles south of the Bahr el Arab, 
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including this territory in Dar Rizayqat by doing so.  This was later reduced to 20 
miles, and arrangements were made to allow the Dinka to use areas north of that 
boundary at certain times of the year.
67
   Vaughan describes very clearly the effort that 
went into assisting the tribes to agree the management of this boundary.  In general, 
Arab tribes did better out of the British: the Kababish of Kordofan and the Bani Halba 
are prominent examples.  The first won the support of the British before the invasion 
of Darfur in 1916, with the result that the boundary between Darfur and Kordofan was 
drawn very much in favour of the Kababish, relative to the Meidob on the Darfur side 
of the line.
68
  The Kababish have held the upper hand over the Meidob ever since, 
although the latter were by no means powerless to fight back.  Of all the colonial 
boundary decisions this was perhaps the worst, yet it has not, so far as I am aware, 
had any influence on current events in Darfur. 
 
The history of conflict between the Bani Halba and the Fur dates back at least to the 
early 19
th
 century when the Sultan Muhammad al Fadl „irritated by the power, wealth 
and independent attitude of the Beni Holba rendered them innocuous by the 
“bloodbath of the Beni Holba....”‟69  It is probable that this reflected competition for 
control of important areas south of Jebel Marra.  Of all the Arab Baqqara, the Bani 
Halba have the closest direct contact with the Fur heartland centred on Zalingei.  Until 
the Condominium, the Fur considered that their Dar Diima extended all the way to 
Wadi Bulbul, quite close to Nyala.  The British put the line further north and west.  
„All Arabs North of this line must move South, into Southern Darfur District.  Fur to 
the South of this line may take their choice of moving North or remaining as 
“Aghrab” („Strangers‟) under the Arabs.  Arabs may graze over the Fur boundary but 
not make villages or cultivation.‟70   
 
At a later period in the Condominium, it appears the rule on cultivation was relaxed.  
The Zalingei District Book describes the situation:  
 
During the rains the Dar is filled with Arabs grazing, and the Fur mainly speak 
Arabic as do all the Nyala border Fur. There is a certain amount of trouble 
with Arabs over damage to crops and use of wells, and continual hide and seek 
over listing [ie for tax purposes].  It has now been decided that the nas who 
„Kharif‟ in a Dar will be listed in that Dar, and the poll tax rates in Bani Halba 
will be raised to the Fur standard to prevent tax evasion.
71
   
 
This example is important.  Fighting between the Fur and the Bani Halba in the Wadi 
Salih area was a major factor in the 1987 civil war and one of the many current 
conflicts as well.  It is also one of the clearest examples of the fact that a dar is not a 
tribal homeland, as is now claimed.  As Holy puts it, „the boundaries of Berti society 
are not territorial but social or political.‟  
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“Reforming” the Idarat al Ahlia 
 
From 1927 onwards, with variations in the language and some back steps, the colonial 
Government steadily worked to change the „native administration‟ and absorb it into a 
system of democratic local government.
72
  This vision culminated in the Local 
Government Ordinance of 1951.  For the first time, the administrative and judicial 
sides of the idarat al ahlia were clearly separated.    The days of „eating‟ were over, in 
principle at least, and all revenues were to go to the Council. 
 
The establishment of a Ministry of Local Government, in 1954, heralded the end of 
the policy that each Native Administration should be staffed from among its own 
people, and that formal education was not necessary for such posts. The 1960 Local 
Government Act aimed to provide councils with an executive staff recruited by the 
Ministry centrally. The idarat al ahlia was under attack from dissident elements 
within each tribe and from liberal party politicians.  At the same time the tribal 
leadership were acquiring personal interests outside their tribe.  After the October 
Revolution in 1964 there were proposals under the democratic government to abolish 
the idarat al ahlia.
73
 These were initially resisted, partly through the tribal 
leadership‟s influence on the political parties, but in 1971 the idarat al ahlia was 
abolished under the new military regime‟s People‟s Local Government Act.  This 
combined decentralisation from Khartoum to the provinces with centralisation within 
each province. A Provincial Executive Council took over all budgets and executive 
powers from the existing local councils.  At the same time, the local councils were 
divided into much smaller units: 500 in all of Sudan, in place of just 86. Dar Masalit, 
for example, was divided into one Town Council, for Geneina, and three Rural 
Councils.
74
  In a precursor of events in the 1990s, these changes led to a series of 
disputes over boundaries: 16 in South Darfur alone.
75
  In a trend apparent from the 
1950s, the focus of these reforms was firmly on administration and political 
management.  Little if any consideration was given to what would replace the judicial 
functions of the idarat al ahlia.     
 
In 1984, the Native Administration was re-instated in Darfur by an administrative 
circular from the Deputy Governor.  The tribal leadership was to have both 
administrative and judicial powers.  How far this was to be a return to the structures 
of the colonial Native Courts Ordinance 1932 and Local Government Ordinance 
1951, is not clear.  It seems to have been more like a reversion to the early colonial 
period when all powers were vested in the nazirs and omdas. 
 
From the mid 1990s onward, the current Government of Sudan has made a range of 
changes to the idarat al ahlia. It is reported that the new acts set a framework which is 
„structurally similar to what used to be practiced.‟ A local government unit is now 
called a locality and it is responsible for most basic services and development.  For 
this it keeps 60% of agricultural and livestock taxes, compared with 50% in the 
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colonial system of the 1930s.  The Local Government Act was paralleled by a 2004 
Town and Rural Courts Act dealing with customary law courts.
 76
    
 
It was not, however, the legal framework which had the greatest impact on the idarat 
al ahlia under the current Government.  That was to come from a radical territorial 
redivision.
77
  Some have seen this as a re-run of the colonial principle of „divide and 
rule.‟ The British had, in fact, put considerable efforts into the opposite policy, what 
might be termed „consolidate and rule indirectly.‟  They spent nearly 40 years trying 
to get the Ma‟aliya to join the Rizayqat, the Fallata to join the Habbaniya and the 
different Zaghawa clans to come together under one leadership.  William Luce‟s 
meeting with the Gimr chiefs was just one instance of the distinctly frosty colonial 
response to attempts to sub-divide tribal units at lower levels in the hierarchy. 
 
Whatever their reasoning, the current regime failed to learn the lesson taught to 
Numeiri:  administrative sub-division leads to a proliferation of boundary disputes 
and tribal fights.  By 1995, what had been just two districts under the British became 
38 localities and sub-localities.  Takana describes the result: „not a single tribe in 
South Darfur is not engaged with its neighbors in the boundary issue.‟  This political 
competition even went below the tribe, with different omodiyyas competing for and 
winning their own localities.  The Habbaniya, for example, ended up with six.  Some 
30 years after the omdas had first tried to unseat their nazir, Ali El Ghaali, they had 
finally won.    Multiple small units cost money; consolidation was what made the 
idarat al ahlia economic.  In 2001, Government decreed a reduction of 30% in the 
number of localities, but it was too late.
78
  Facts had been created on the ground.  The 
earliest, perhaps the worst, effects of redivision were seen in Dar Masalit, where the 
creation of new emirates for Arab groups contributed to, even led to, outright war in 
1995.  The situation in Dar Masalit remains extremely tense to this day.
79
   
 
All these developments have been accompanied by a fundamental change of attitude 
towards the structures of political and social organisation which underpin the idarat al 
ahlia.  Many groups now see it in their interest to deny the whole concept of a dar as 
a unit in which kinship and territoriality are managed in accordance with the principle 
that the original settlers maintain some rights over the land in their dar.  Claims made 
by the Tarjam in a dispute with the Fur during the current conflict make this plain: 
 
a. To release the Targum tribal leader Mohamed Yagoub, the Omda, and other Targum 
members from custody. 
b. Fur tribe should recognize the Targum as Sudanese citizens who are entitled to 
every right on these lands which belong only to God Almighty. 
c. The Fur must drop the claim that Targum are to follow them and agree that the 
Targum should have a „Nazirate‟ independent administration of their own. 
d. To cancel all cases against all persons who were engaged in this tribal war. 
e. All roads should be opened and access to drinking water spots should be allowed.
80
 
 
If point b were to be accepted as the general rule, it would be the death knell of the 
idarat al ahlia in its current form.  The most likely outcome of the Tarjam‟s position 
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is that land becomes individual property, and society is re-organised in geographic 
units, with some form of local council and a state-sponsored judicial system.  This 
would mean abandoning the flexibility and social cohesion on which many Darfuris 
still depend for their livelihoods. 
 
It is some encouragement that Darfuris consulted in the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and 
Consultation (DDDC) did not support the Tarjam‟s view.  Even among younger 
people in North Darfur, who were clearly more sympathetic to that view, the 
consensus was that the best way to reduce conflict is to support decisions by the 
„native administration‟ and „ensure that users of hakoora land recognize and respect 
the rights of its owners.‟81 
 
The International Community‟s Strategy for Darfur 
 
Western governments are extremely risk-averse about Darfur, wishing to avoid, in the 
words of one official, „anything toxic.‟  In this context „toxic‟ means talking to, or 
supporting the Government of Sudan in any way.    As an extreme example of this 
attitude, senior Darfuris recall the way Condoleeza Rice refused to speak to the Wali 
of North Darfur in El Fasher.   
 
This attitude is unfortunate, because it is extremely hard to see a solution which does 
not give a major role to government.  Western governments‟ influence on events will 
be severely limited by their unwillingness to deal with Government.  In 1989, the El 
Fasher Reconciliation Agreement to end the first Darfur civil war made nine 
stipulations.  Seven were actions for Government: 
 
1. The presence of Government in the form of armed forces should be guaranteed. 
2. The Government shall deport aliens entering Darfur illegally. 
3. The Government undertakes to open routes of migration for the nomads. It shall 
maintain a heavy presence to safeguard the rights of both pastoralists and farmers. 
4. The Government shall evict any groups that have occupied villages or farms. 
5. The Government shall dissolve any organizations that do not work according to 
the law.   
6. The Government shall scrutinize the activities of all foreign organisations working 
in the region. 
7. The Government shall issue laws which mete out severe penalties on those who 
burn pastures, close migration routes, ....... 
 
Government failed to deliver that time, and its subsequent actions have destroyed 
almost all its political capital in Darfur.  Nevertheless, in consultations Darfuris are 
almost unanimous that it is necessary to „Empower native administrations with the 
authority and required capacity to actively participate in helping maintain security.‟  
And Native Administrations cannot work without effective support from Government.  
In the words of the tribal leaders and stakeholders of Western Darfur, „It is critical 
that the authority of native administrations is supported so that it can effectively 
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impose its powers to help control illegal weapons, deal firmly with outlaws, etc., until 
peace prevails and peaceful coexistence is reached between concerned parties.‟ 82 
 
Because of their reluctance to deal with Government, Western countries have 
delegated Darfur to the United Nations, to the African Union and to NGOs.  The UN 
strategy has four tracks: political settlement, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance 
and recovery and development.  The main focus is on the first track, a political 
settlement between the different rebel groups and Government: the conflict is still 
seen as a rebellion by a marginalised people against an oppressive government.  Since 
2009, the UN-supported Joint Mediation Support Team has been facilitating 
negotiation between Government of Sudan and different rebel groups, but these have 
made little progress.  In 2011, a number of countries including the USA agreed the 
idea of a Darfur Political Process (DPP), designed to shift the focus of peace efforts 
back to Darfur itself and to put it in the hands of elected representatives, traditional 
leaders and civil society.  „The DPP has deeply divided the UN and AU. Mbeki, like 
the Sudanese government, favours pushing ahead with it without delay. The UN and 
many western governments argue that it cannot be launched amid military offensives 
.....‟83   It is still impossible to overcome the reluctance to work with Government in 
Darfur, even with the support of the African Union.   
 
While there are many good reasons to be suspicious of Government of Sudan, it will 
be impossible to address the issues I have discussed in this paper without accepting 
some form of Darfur Political Process which takes discussions out of the hands of 
those whose principal, if not only, interest is in gaining a share of power.   
 
One example may help to illustrate the depth of the international community‟s lack of 
knowledge and understanding about the idarat al ahlia.  The Heidelberg Darfur 
Dialogue took place in Khartoum and Heidelberg, not Darfur, between 2008 and 
2010.  The outcome was a „Draft Darfur Peace Agreement‟.  This presents great 
detail, in legalistic terms, about power-sharing, revenue sharing, human rights, etc.  
The Native Administration is allocated just one page, in wording which makes it very 
clear that it is regarded as a historical curiosity, as an exhibit in the museum of 
cultural heritage:  „The native administration of Darfur is part of its cultural heritage 
and provides for the Darfurian identity. The establishment of the native administration 
shall follow the tradition and customs of the community concerned.‟  All serious local 
government is to be in the hands of bureaucratic local councils with professional staff 
recruited on ability alone.  On the judicial side: 
 
The Ajaweed, a traditional procedure for the resolution of conflicts, shall be 
institutionalized and assume the function of a truth and reconciliation 
mechanism. ..... the Ajaweed shall engage in the procedures foreseen in their 
specific local traditions for the purpose of facilitating the search for peace, 
truth and reconciliation. Within the limits of the specific local cultural 
tradition and as far as this enhances the search for peace, truth and 
reconciliation, the Ajaweed shall conduct their procedures with a view to 
facilitate confessions and apologies.  
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It would be difficult to match this as a comprehensive misreading of the institutions it 
took the Fur Sultanate and the tribes of Darfur centuries to develop; a misreading 
designed to fit those institutions into Western conceptions of society, peace and 
justice.
84
  
 
However, there are two UN projects which are attempting to address issues which 
would come under the banner of the idarat al ahlia.  Under the Darfur Community 
Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF), NGOs are working with tribal leaderships, in 
some cases funding their activities.  The approach is ad hoc and there is no overall 
strategy, or capacity to form one.  It took the British many years to achieve a rather 
imperfect understanding of the institutions underlying the idarat al ahlia, and the 
highly political personalities which led it.  An NGO which was working on 
humanitarian aid until last year, and which is only funded for two years anyway, 
cannot hope to achieve the same.   The result is the embarassing sight of Darfuri 
shaykhs and omdas, who have been brought up in a centuries-old tradition of conflict 
management, being taught „How to Work With Conflict‟ out of a glossy manual 
printed in Birmingham. 
 
The other UN programme is the Darfur Rule of Law Programme started in 2004.  The 
approach is wholly „Western‟:  
   
 to build on the existing legal infrastructure by strengthening the immediate 
protection of civilians and providing a form of legal redress for human rights 
violations, protection deficits and lack of security. UNDP works ... with all the 
legal institutions in Darfur – including the judiciary, the attorney-general‟s 
office, lawyers, paralegals, the police and other law-enforcement bodies. 
 
Programme activities include mobile legal aid clinics and the appointment of 
„paralegals, known as Community Mobilisers.‟  The programme is designed on a 
standard international blueprint, one which is blind to the idarat al ahlia, to Sharia, 
and to customary law. 
 
Weak as the effort has been, there are already signs that important sections of the 
international community have lost interest in Darfur.  Of the programmes mentioned 
above, the latest press relief on the Rule of Law Programme website is 2008, the latest 
DCPSF updates and workplans are for 2009, and the latest press release on the DDDC 
website is also from 2009.
85
  
 
Change and Continuity 
 
The more one learns about Darfur, the greater one‟s admiration for the people who 
have built its institutions and made them work. Just as MacMichael came to 
appreciate how well Ali Dinar had handled a difficult job, so I think many Sudanese 
now appreciate what the British did, despite some glaring errors.  To quote one recent 
Sudanese comment, „If properly maintained, the colonial native administration could 
have worked successfully to maintain law and order in any traditional communities.‟  
More than that, there was progress.  The same commentator describes the 1951 Local 
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Government Act as „in many respects the best system of local government the Sudan 
has ever had.‟86  Tribal leaders whose grandfathers made their living from slaving and 
whose fathers fought Ali Dinar‟s troops on horseback had begun to get used to the 
bureaucratic forms of court procedure and council administration.   
 
There have been a number of attempts to define a critical break in Darfur history, a 
break which lies at the root of the current problems.  The end of the Fur sultanate, 
after which the British re-tribalized Darfur, is a popular one.  Numeiri‟s reforms of 
1970 and the politicization of the idarat al ahlia since the mid-1990s are others.  
Having read my way through from Browne in 1794 to de Waal, Takana and others in 
the 21
st
 century, I find it much easier to see continuity.  The Kababish were raiding in 
1794.  They probably still are.  The Fur Sultan was issuing warrants which said much 
the same as a Governor General‟s warrant in the 1940s:  that „Sheikh fulan has been 
found to be honest and upstanding and the people under his benevolent rule will obey 
him all things.‟  All three parts of the statement were often lies; and the Sultan 
probably had his fingers crossed when he signed it, just like the Governor General.   
 
The same applies to fights between tribes.  We do not have many records of these 
under the early Sultanate, but we do know the Sultan‟s reaction to those he heard of 
was ferocious.  One can suspect that his officials – the maqdums and others – dealt 
with many more.  Even guns on the Chad border are not new.  In 1912, Ali Dinar 
wrote to Muhammad Bakhit Abu Risha, the independent Sultan of Dar Sula, to 
complain „you have been negligent in regard to firearms ... your people have begun to 
sell them to strangers‟.87  In reply, Muhammad Bakhit complained that Darfuris had 
robbed a group of his hunters of fifteen big elephant tusks.  Despite the relative 
success the British had in keeping the peace, there is hardly a single year of the 
Condominium in which the Governor did not report a number of tribal fights.  As late 
as 1945, the greatest problem was tribal enmity leading to armed fights.  „The 
repercussions of two such enmities were only suppressed after prolonged legal and 
administrative proceedings.‟88  The current authorities in South Darfur might take 
consolation for their problems from the fact that in 1949 the Governor was distracted 
by „unnecessary and vexatious boundary disputes between Habbania and Rizeigat, 
Habbania and Beigo, Taaisha and Gimr, which dragged on through the year and 
absorbed a great deal of administrative time.‟ 
 
Conclusion: How to Govern Darfur? 
 
I have tried to draw a picture of a society which worked.  At the bottom of this two-
layer society, the tribes were cohesive and functional.  There was a solid social 
contract between the individual and society.  The tribal leadership was close to, and 
politically responsive to, the ordinary people.  Competition for followers ensured 
accountability.  The top layer of this society was formed by the relationship between 
the tribal leadership and the state; whether it was the Fur Sultanate, the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium, or the Government of Sudan.  Here too there was a social 
contract essentially that the nazirs, omdas and shaykhs would keep the peace, justly, 
and deliver taxation in return for the state‟s even-handed support.  Under the Sultanate 
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and the Condominium, at least, the state was able to project credible power and to 
maintain the position of neutrality needed to make good on its side of this contract.  
 
This society had well understood institutions for managing mobility, which were 
articulated through two fundamental social obligations: the payment of tax and the 
acceptance of justice.  In this framework the dar is not a homeland, it is a territory in 
which one group has, by virtue of being the first to arrive, become the representative 
of society, which function it serves by collecting tax and providing hukm.   
 
Of course this highly ideal model conceals a multitude of imperfections.  A system 
based on personality and on an unwritten code held in the communal memory, is 
bound to drift away from the ideal more often than not.  The Rizayqat, for example, 
never accepted the social obligations of the Fur Sultanate.  Between major tribes, 
blood money obligations only became standard under the Condominium.  However, 
within their respective boundaries, the Fur Sultanate, the Condominium and, in its 
early years at least, independent Sudan all had hegemony in Darfur; hegemony in the 
sense of control achieved through „a complex mix of coercion and consent ...[with] a 
singular dominant way of seeing politics‟.89  That single dominant way of seeing 
politics was founded on an acceptance of the principles I have just laid out: that the 
individual‟s identity was defined through a combination of kinship and territoriality, 
embodied in the tribe; that all citizens owed the state tax and submission to its justice; 
that the tribal leadership was acceptable as the representative of the state; and that 
mobility and relations between different ethnic groups would be managed through the 
institution of the dar.   
 
As Vaughan describes, consent on the fundamentals left ample space for prolonged 
negotiation over implementation.  Which tribal leaders were acceptable, where the 
boundaries of each dar lay, who belonged to which dar, what constituted zulm, and 
what was the appropriate level of „eating‟, were all fertile areas for struggle.90  This 
leads to the most important conclusion of my talk.  A system like the idarat al ahlia 
needs continuous and intensive management by a capable state.  It is not some state of 
nature in which peaceful communities will co-exist, once a just distribution of 
resources is achieved. Nachtigal describes the Fur Sultan‟s constant round of 
ceremonial duties, his demands that the faqihs of Darfur join him for Ramadan, and 
his continuous struggle to impose control, especially on the tribes at the periphery of 
the Sultanate.  He worked hard.  Throughout the Condominium, governors‟ reports 
harp on the effort required to stop boundary disputes, to prevent omdas from 
overthrowing their nazirs, and to persuade different tribes to form reasonable 
administrative units.  In many areas they failed.  But they held the second line of 
defence.  They prevented outright war, they kept to the basic principles of the system, 
and they maintained the consensus that it was a good system.  
 
If anything, that consensus was weakest among the British themselves.  By the 1940s 
their support for the idarat al ahlia was being watered down by efforts to introduce 
electoral democracy, and the rule-bound structures of local government.  Their 
discomfort over the matter of „eating‟ meant they underestimated the risk of 
weakening the tribes at their most important point: the relationship between the 
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shaykh and his followers, with its subtle trade-offs between taxation, „eating‟ and re-
distribution among the followers. This process accelerated after independence, ending 
in the 1970 abolition of the idarat al ahlia.  Although that decision was rolled back, it 
was a big step towards the current situation, in which the consensus behind the idarat 
al ahlia in Darfur is close to being broken.   
 
When I started this research, I hoped to see a clear way forward for Government in 
Darfur.  I was inclined to believe that if the idarat al ahlia has survived this long, it 
must still have a part to play; especially so since nothing better is in sight.  After eight 
weeks‟ reading, I am much less certain.  One thing is clear.  No progress is likely 
without an effective government; one which is both demonstrably even-handed and 
demonstrably capable of supporting the rule of law, with force if necessary.  At the 
moment the Government of Sudan is neither of those things.  Every reconciliation 
conference between warring tribes ends with a list of actions for government, which 
are not performed. It is also clear that a political agreement in Doha between 
Government of Sudan and rebel groups representing a minority of Darfur tribes can 
contribute little to the issues I have described.  If anything, power-sharing in a Darfur 
Government will reinforce the political competition which has driven current 
conflicts.  
 
What is much less certain is whether the consensus supporting the principles of the 
idarat al ahlia can be re-established.  In giving a dar to every minor lineage which 
demands it, government has opened Pandora‟s box.  There is a large younger 
generation that no longer has direct experience of living entirely within the social 
obligations of a rural tribe. With oil revenues and a large modern metropolis in 
Khartoum, the economic balance has shifted a long way against the farmers and 
herders of Darfur.  Will it really be possible to re-establish a social structure based on 
zakat, as 10% of a dryland millet crop, and fines paid at the rate of two head of cattle 
for adultery?  
 
Since the 17
th
 century the different rulers of Darfur have built a state, and extended 
the boundaries of that state, using their particular answer to the question of my title: 
How to Govern Darfur?  That answer was based on the institutions of the idarat al 
ahlia, which formed what I have come to think of as the Darfur Social Contract.  The 
civil wars which started in the late 1980s represent a breakdown of that social 
contract.  This was caused by the state‟s inability, or unwillingness, to honour its side 
of the contract.  But there was a larger failure.  Economic development and social 
change meant that the institutions of that contract were losing their relevance.  By 
mismanaging its attempt to transform the idarat al ahlia into a more modern set of 
institutions, the state has come close to breaking the contract altogether.  It has 
undermined the Darfuris‟ acceptance of their side of the contract: their citizens‟ 
obligations to pay tax and acknowledge the rule, hukm, of the State‟s representatives.  
 
In conclusion, do I have an answer to my question: How to Govern Darfur?  Perhaps I 
do.  It is summed up using the concept of „hegemony‟ I gave earlier: a complex mix 
of coercion and consent built around a single, dominant idea about how society 
works. Coercion will be needed, by professional security forces which fully 
understand Darfur society and politics, but which are not captured by any part of that 
society.  In other words, neither the janjawid nor UNAMID fit the bill.  And consent 
must be rebuilt.  As the Condominium found, this takes continuous effort by a 
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Government service which is respected, but not necessarily popular.  To use the 
Humr‟s word, it must be haramy: cunning and ruthless, but not unfair.    
